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I
INTRODUCTION
Definitions of academic freedom have developed in response to actual
historical circumstances. Threats to professors from university trustees
loomed behind the seminal professional definition produced in 1915 by a
committee of eminent professors for the first annual meeting of the American
Association of University Professors ("AAUP"). Threats to universities from
the state, arising out of general concerns during the late 1940s and 1950s
about the dangers of communism to American society and institutions,
prompted the cases that led the Supreme Court to identify academic freedom
as a first amendment right.
Both the professional and the constitutional definitions of academic
freedom' stressed the value of critical inquiry in universities. But each
definition understandably focused on the distinctive contemporary threats to
this value. Not surprisingly, the AAUP definition, which was eventually
accepted by many universities and educational organizations, emphasized the
protection of individual professors against lay trustees, whereas the
constitutional definition emphasized the protection of the entire university
community against state intervention. Neither definition, however, was
monolithic. The AAUP recognized the danger to academic inquiry from
legislative interference, and Supreme Court opinions treated constitutional
academic freedom as an individual right of professors as well as an
institutional right of universities.
For many years, "individual" and "institutional" definitions of academic
freedom seemed complementary rather than in tension with each other.
Significantly, the AAUP's first Supreme Court brief on the subject of academic
freedom stressed that university autonomy from the state is a necessary
condition for the academic freedom of professors. 2 Yet the dramatic growth
of litigation by students and professors against universities, dating roughly
from the late 1960s, has highlighted the tension between individual and
institutional academic freedom. Increasingly, administrators and trustees
have invoked institutional academic freedom not as an additional layer of
protection for professors against the state, but as a bar to judicial review of
claims against universities by professors alleging institutional violations of
individual academic freedom.
1. Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66
Tex L Rev 1265 (1988), is the work that most explicitly identifies and compares the professional and
constitutional definitions. I find these two definitions much more compatible than does Professor
Metzger. See, for example, text accompanying notes 4-5, 44-46, 50-57, 254-58. See also J. Peter
Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 Yale LJ 251 (1989) (following
Metzger in contrasting individual emphasis of professional definition with institutional emphasis of
constitutional definition); David M. Rabban, Academic Freedom, in Leonard Levy, Kenneth L. Karst &
Dennis J. Mahoney, eds, I Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 12 (MacMillan, 1986) (comparing
uncertainty of constitutional definition with elaborated professional definition).
2. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae, Barenblatt v United States, 360 US 109 (1959).
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's glorification of academic freedom as a
"special concern of the First Amendment" has produced hyperbolic rhetoric
but only scant, and often ambiguous, analytic content. The Court has never
explained systematically the theory behind its relatively recent incorporation
of academic freedom into the first amendment, a problem occasionally
acknowledged by the justices themselves. Without such a theory, it is difficult
to address the constitutional implications of the tension between the
individual and institutional components of academic freedom.
Some commentators have maintained that the courts, especially the
Supreme Court, seem to be defining constitutional academic freedom
exclusively in institutional terms.4 Indeed, a major recent analysis comments
approvingly on this perceived development. 5 I disagree. Courts may have
been presented with more institutional claims than individual claims of
academic freedom, but they have also recognized that the first amendment
protects individual academic freedom. Although courts have identified both
forms of academic freedom, they have not fully addressed, and certainly have
not resolved, the tensions between them.
In this article, I summarize and contrast the professional and
constitutional treatments of academic freedom, justify distinctive first
amendment analysis of academic speech that differs both from the
professional definition of academic freedom and from the constitutional free
speech of citizens generally, and respond to arguments that courts lack
competence to decide academic freedom disputes between professors and
universities. In my opinion, academic freedom is more than just a desirable
policy promoted by the AAUP and adopted within the academic world. Core
first amendment values-such as critical inquiry, the search for knowledge,
and toleration of dissent-support constitutionalizing some, but not all, of the
speech covered by the professional definition of academic freedom. These
first amendment values justify protecting both the professional speech of
faculty and the autonomy of universities to make decisions about educational
policy. In order to engage in critical inquiry, professors need some degree of
independence from their university employers, and universities need some
degree of independence from the state. Asserting constitutional protection
for professors and universities is not simply a form of special pleading to
elevate the job-related concerns of a particular profession or the institutional
interests of a particular enterprise. Rather, constitutional academic freedom
promotes first amendment values of general concern to all citizens in a
democracy.
This functional justification of academic freedom as "a special concern of
the First Amendment" is theoretically defensible as applied only to the
distinctive roles of professors and universities. Yet first amendment academic
freedom can be viewed doctrinally as an aspect of a developing but
3. Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 603 (1967).
4. See Byrne, 99 Yale LJ 251 (cited in note 1); Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev 1265 (cited in note 1),
5. Byrne, 99 Yale LJ 251 (cited in note 1).
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insufficiently appreciated judicial trend to construe the first amendment in
institutional context. Universities are not the only institutions to which
special first amendment rules apply. Courts have increasingly observed that
the level of first amendment protection varies with the functions of
institutions. Newspapers and libraries, for example, are subject to very
different first amendment standards than military bases and prisons.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has frequently distinguished institutional
functions in explaining why more restrictions on speech are appropriate in
elementary and secondary schools than in universities. In a meaningful sense,
first amendment academic freedom is only an illustration of the general first
amendment principle that special rules about speech must be tailored to the
distinctive functions of various institutions. First amendment academic
freedom is "special," but so are the free speech rules that apply in other
institutions with different functions. These other free speech rules may not
have been separately named, as the Supreme Court has specifically extolled
"academic freedom," but they serve the similar purpose of applying the first
amendment in institutional context.
After attempting to justify the Supreme Court's constitutionalization of
academic freedom, I address the complicated circumstances in which first
amendment academic freedom claims may arise and potentially conflict.
Three basic categories stand out: claims of professors against faculty
colleagues, administrators, or trustees; claims of professors against the state;
and claims of universities against the state. The state action necessary to
invoke the first amendment exists in all three categories of claims at public
universities. In private universities, by contrast, state action applies only to
claims by professors and universities against the state. Claims by professors
at private institutions against faculty colleagues, administrators, or trustees
cannot raise first amendment issues because no state action exists. Yet a
private university can assert institutional academic freedom as a defense to
judicial review of faculty claims that the university violated its contractual
commitments to academic freedom. The state action requirement, in addition
to complicating constitutional analysis, illustrates one major difference
between the constitutional definition of academic freedom and the
professional one, which applies equally in public and private universities.
Constitutional analysis is further complicated because public universities
may invoke the first amendment to assert independence from the states that
create them, and simultaneously are themselves state institutions constrained
by the first amendment. For example, state universities may be subject to
some legislative controls from which private universities are constitutionally
protected. Yet the first amendment might also require state universities to
allow more diversity of thought than private universities. Although I address
these important issues, I focus on competing first amendment academic
freedom claims between individual professors and state universities, which
provide the context of most current disputes. I analyze claims by professors
that university decisions justified on academic grounds in fact violate
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academic freedom. Some of these claims allege that the justifications are
pretexts, while others allege that the stated grounds themselves reflect
impermissible intellectual orthodoxies inconsistent with academic freedom. I
conclude by considering attempts to extend individual academic freedom
beyond teaching and scholarship to speech on university affairs generally and
to faculty participation in university governance.
II
THE THEORY OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE AAUP's 1915
DECLARATION
The AAUP's 1915 Declaration of Principles, 6 the first comprehensive
analysis of academic freedom in the United States, remains the foundation for
the nonlegal understanding of academic freedom within the academic world.
Adapting the German concept of academic freedom to the American context,
the 1915 Declaration limited itself to the academic freedom of the professor,
while recognizing that student academic freedom had been a major
component of the German tradition. The 1915 Declaration identified three
elements of academic freedom: "freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of
teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extramural utterance
and action." The authors explained their inclusion of extramural freedom,
which had not been part of the German understanding of faculty academic
freedom, by observing that this issue had arisen more frequently than the
other two in the five investigations of university controversies already
completed by AAUP committees during the year since the association's
founding.7
The 1915 Declaration defined academic freedom in relation to the
functions of professors and universities. It viewed the basic role of professors
as sharing the results of their independent and expert scholarly investigations
with students and the general public. 8 Academic freedom, it added, serves
the fundamental purposes of universities, identified as promoting inquiry and
knowledge, providing instruction to students, and, reflecting a key theme of
the progressive era, developing experts for public service. 9 Throughout this
discussion, the 1915 Declaration stressed the social benefits of scholarly work
in universities. Education and knowledge, it reiterated, are essential to a
civilized and democratic society. 0 In florid but deeply felt language, the 1915
6. AAUP, Declaration of Principles (1915), reprinted in Louis Joughin, ed, Academic Freedom and
Tenure, app A at 157-76 (Univ of Wisconsin Press, 1969) ("1915 Declaration"); see Appendix A, 53 L
& Contemp Probs 393 (Summer 1990) ("Appendix A").
7. 1915 Declaration at 157-58; Appendix A at 393 (cited in note 6). Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at
1275 (cited in note 1), rather than the 1915 Declaration itself, highlights the inclusion of extramural
freedom as an addition to the German model. See also Walter P. Metzger, The German Contribution to
the American Theory of Academic Freedom, in Walter P. Metzger, ed, The American Concept of Academic
Freedom (Arno Press, 1977).
8. 1915 Declaration at 162; Appendix A at 396 (cited in note 6).
9. 1915 Declaration at 163-64; Appendix A at 397, 398 (cited in note 6).
10. 1915 Declaration at 161, 163, 166-68; Appendix A at 396, 397-99 (cited in note 6).
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Declaration emphasized that the university "should be an intellectual
experiment station, where new ideas may germinate and where their fruit,
though still distasteful to the community as a whole, may be allowed to ripen
until finally, perchance, it may become a part of the accepted intellectual food
of the nation or of the world." Yet the 1915 Declaration simultaneously
cautioned that the university also makes a social contribution by conserving
unfashionable but valuable intellectual traditions and by checking both the
hasty impulses of popular opinion and the tendency toward conformity in
modern democracies. " I
The 1915 Declaration identified threats to academic freedom as
impediments to these functions. It focused primarily on boards of trustees,
the acknowledged source of power in universities.1 2 Unfortunately, trustees,
who should view themselves as holders of a public trust in private as well as in
public institutions, too often acted as if they were simply autocratic
employers. Many trustees felt free to use the power of dismissal to impose
their personal ideological and pedagogical views on professors. Such a
conception of the university as the equivalent of "an ordinary business
venture," the 1915 Declaration protested, reveals "a radical failure to
apprehend the nature of the social function discharged by the professional
scholar."' 3 Professorial opinions lose their value if any suspicion exists that
they are not the product of free scholarly inquiry but are guided by the
untrained and self-interested views of others. Professors, like judges, should
be regarded as appointees rather than as employees, because both professors
and judges must remain independent of their nominal employers in order to
perform their professional functions. It is as inappropriate for trustees to
dictate conclusions to a professor as it is for the president to dictate legal
reasoning to the judges he appoints. Correspondingly, neither trustees nor
presidents are responsible for the opinions their appointees express.' 4
Although the 1915 Declaration focused on trustees, it also identified the
threat posed by legislatures to academic freedom in state universities.
Observing the dependence of state universities on legislative funding, the
1915 Declaration worried that legislators might try to use the state's purse
strings to manipulate the academic inquiries of professors, particularly when
scholarly views might deviate from strong public opinions or from established
government policies. While trustee interference with academic freedom
would typically derive from the opposition of businessmen to the more liberal
social and economic views of professors,' 5 state and public pressure would
11. 1915 Declaration at 167-68; Appendix A at 400 (cited in note 6).
12. Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1276-78 (cited in note 1) makes clear that the drafters of the 1915
Declaration decided not to challenge lay legal control of universities. Convinced about the certain
failure of any such challenge, they accepted that " 'outside' was ensconsed within." Id at 1277.
13. 1915 Declaration at 161; Appendix A at 396 (cited in note 6).
14. See generally 1915 Declaration at 160-63; Appendix A at 397 (cited in note 6).
15. The 1915 Declaration observed that ecclesiastical interference with philosophy and the
natural sciences constituted the main threat to academic freedom in earlier periods of American
history. 1915 Declaration at 165-66; Appendix A at 399-400 (cited in note 6).
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predictably threaten conservative professors who disagree with a political
program of reform. Whatever the ideological source of these pressures on
academic freedom, the 1915 Declaration emphasized, the university should be
an "inviolable refuge" for independent scholarly investigation. 16
The committee of professors who drafted the 1915 Declaration made a
special point of dissociating academic freedom from broad claims of faculty
autonomy. "It is," they maintained, "in no sense the contention of this
committee that academic freedom implies that individual teachers should be
exempt from all restraints as to the matter or manner of their utterances,
either within or without the university."' 7 Professors who fail to meet
scholarly standards of competence, or who abuse their positions to
indoctrinate students, cannot claim the protection of academic freedom and
can be disciplined. 18 Yet while lay governing boards are competent to
evaluate disputes over morals or neglect of duties, controversies involving the
expression of scholarly opinion must be judged, at least initially, by
professional peers, who alone have the necessary qualifications. Assigning
this responsibility to others inevitably raises the suspicion of a decision based
on irrelevant and improper motives.' 9
After substantial internal debate, the drafters of the 1915 Declaration
decided that the academic freedom they were extending to extramural
utterances should not be limited to subjects within a scholar's professional
specialties. Some expressed concern that broad protection for extramural
utterances would encourage professors to speak irresponsibly beyond their
expertise and would unjustifiably give them more rights to political
expression than other employees. The view that ultimately prevailed
acknowledged the "obvious" point that professors speaking outside the
university "are under a peculiar obligation to avoid hasty or unverified or
exaggerated statements, and to refrain from intemperate or sensational
modes of expression." But the 1915 Declaration also quoted with approval
the conclusion of a Wisconsin state agency that "it is neither possible nor
desirable to deprive a college professor of the political rights vouchsafed to
every citizen." 20
In context, this quotation was seriously misleading. Existing law made
clear that both public and private employees could be fired by employers for
speech the employees were free to make as citizens. In Holmes's famous
phrase, "petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman." 2' Holmes could have made the
16. 1915 Declaration at 167-68; Appendix A at 400 (cited in note 6).
17. 1915 Declaration at 173; Appendix A at 404 (cited in note 6).
18. See 1915 Declaration at 170, 173; Appendix A at 402, 404 (cited in note 6).
19. 1915 Declaration at 173-74; Appendix A at 404-05 (cited in note 6); see David M. Rabban,
Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 Tex L Rev 1405, 1408-12 (1988) (discussing limits
on faculty autonomy in 1915 Declaration's conception of academic freedom).
20. 1915 Declaration at 172; Appendix A at 404 (cited in note 6). The 1915 Declaration left
open to future consideration whether professors should take prominent roles in political parties or
run for public office. Id.
21. IcAuliffe v Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass 216, 220, 29 NE 517, 518 (1892).
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same statement had the petitioner been a university professor. Perhaps for
this reason, and because professors actually were being dismissed for
extramural speech unrelated to teaching or research, the 1915 Declaration
"stretched the cloak of protection over an area in which academics proved to
be most exposed." 22
The 1915 Declaration conceded that some universities were endowed
expressly to propagate certain doctrines, citing as examples universities
sponsored by religious denominations, a school established by a manufacturer
to advocate a protective tariff, and an institution funded to advance socialism.
The 1915 Declaration explicitly refused to comment about whether such
"proprietary institutions" should exist, though it did observe that they were
becoming increasingly rare. Rather, it emphasized that they "should not be
permitted to sail under false colors." Proprietary institutions, which are
devoted to the inculcation of ideas, must be distinguished from "ordinary
institutions of learning," which are committed to critical inquiry. Any
university that denies academic freedom to its faculty, the 1915 Declaration
insisted, is a proprietary institution that does not perform the functions of a
true university and thus does not merit public support. 23
III
CONSTITUTIONALIZING ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The term "academic freedom" first attracted constitutional attention
during the 1950s, in connection with the more general response by the
Supreme Court to government investigations of alleged communist
conspiracies. 24 Yet even Supreme Court decisions that mentioned academic
22. Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1276 (cited in note 1). Although Professor Arthur Lovejoy played
a crucial role in convincing his collaborators on the 1915 Declaration to take this position, he
subsequently defined academic freedom as limited to teaching and research. Arthur 0. Lovejoy,
Academic Freedom, in Edwin R. A. Seligman, ed, I Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 384 (MacMillan,
1930). See Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1275 n23, 1276 (cited in note 1). William W. Van Alstyne, The
Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in Edmund L. Pincoffs, ed, The
Concept of Academic Freedom 59, 61-63 (University of Texas Press, 1972) ("The Specific Theory of Academic
Freedom"), criticizes the extension of academic freedom in the 1915 Declaration to include
"aprofessional political liberties."
23. 1915 Declaration at 158-60; Appendix A at 394-95 (cited in note 6). In contrast to the usage
of the 1915 Declaration, "proprietary" normally refers to institutions that are organized for profit.
See Marjorie WebsterJr. College v Middle States Ass 'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F2d 650 (DC
Cir 1970) (challenge by proprietary junior college to policy limiting accreditation to nonprofit
institutions).
24. Prior Supreme Court decisions, without referring to the first amendment or to academic
freedom, protected both teachers and educational institutions from state interference. ChiefJustice
Marshall's famous opinion in the Dartmouth College case was an early example. Trustees of Dartmouth
College v Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518, 652 (1819) (relying on impairment of contracts clause of
U.S. Constitution to uphold "will of the donors" against "will of the state"). Several decisions in the
1920s relied on the due process clause of the 14th amendment to invalidate state laws regulating
education. See, for example, Farrington v Tokushige, 273 US 284 (1927) (invalidating state regulation
of instruction and curriculum in foreign language schools); Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925)
(invalidating state law compelling public school attendance); Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923)
(invalidating state law prohibiting instruction in foreign language before eighth grade). Many
scholars have emphasized that these decisions constitutionally safeguarded institutional autonomy
and pluralism. See, for example, Mark G. Yudof, Wt'hen Government Speaks: Politics, Law, and Government
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freedom did not focus on its meaning. The holdings in those cases were
based on traditional constitutional doctrines involving political expression, 25
due process, 26 and the privilege against self-incrimination. 27  The few
opinions that invoked academic freedom did so more for rhetorical effect than
as an aid to constitutional analysis. Some of these opinions, however,
identified academic freedom as a distinctive right within the first amendment
and applied the concept to both individuals and institutions. For example, in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court decision that initially
incorporated academic freedom within the first amendment, the plurality
opinion referred to a lecturer's personal "liberties in the areas of academic
freedom and political expression" and added that "It]he essentiality of
freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident."-28
The relationship between the theory of academic freedom elaborated in
the 1915 Declaration and the new constitutional right of academic freedom
under the first amendment remains unclear. 29 Courts have used academic
freedom and free speech interchangeably or ambiguously, have attached
Expression in America 227-30 (Univ of Cal Press, 1983); Matthew W. Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic
Freedom, 61 Tex L Rev 817, 830-40 (1983); Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of
Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U Pa L Rev 1293, 1305-09 (1976); William W.
Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An
Unhurried Historical Review, 53 L & Contemp Probs 79, 88-93 (Summer 1990); Mark G. Yudof, Three
Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loyola L Rev 831, 852-53 (1987).
25. See, for example, Barenblatt v United States, 360 US 109 (1959); Sweezy v New Hampshire, 354
US 234 (1957); Adler v Board of Educ., 342 US 485 (1952).
26. See, for example, Wieman v Updegraff, 344 US 183 (1952).
27. See, for example, Slochower v Board of Educ., 350 US 551 (1956). The treatment in
constitutional law casebooks of the early Supreme Court decisions mentioning academic freedom
reinforces the perception that these cases were primarily about other issues. See, for example, Paul
Brest & Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 1102-09 (Little Brown, 2d ed 1983)
(treating Barenblatt under heading "Can the state require speech or expression from an unwilling
citizen?"); Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1406-10 (Foundation Press, I th ed 1985) (treating
Sweezy and Barenblatt under heading "legislative investigations"), 1364-66 (treating Wieman and
Slochower under heading "government demands for information and affirmation"); William Lockhart,
et al, Constitutional Law 983-87 (West, 6th ed 1986) (treating Barenblatt under heading "government
mandated disclosures and freedom of association"); Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional Law 1316-
18 (Little Brown, 1986) (treating Sweezy and Barenblatt under heading "legislative investigations"),
1288 (treating Adler and Wieman under heading "subversive advocacy and association").
In his comprehensive treatise, Professor Tribe does not have a separate section on academic
freedom. Rather, he discusses academic freedom in a lengthy footnote in a section entitled
"distinguishing government's addition of its own voice from government's silencing of others."
Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 812-13 n32 (Foundation Press, 2d ed 1988).
28. Sweezy, 354 US at 250. See Rabban, Academic Freedom at 13 (cited in note 1).
Professors interested in academic freedom immediately recognized the importance of Sweezy. "To
the members of the academic profession," wrote a professor at Dartmouth College who had served
as general secretary of the AAUP,
Sweezy v New Hampshire is quite possibly the most significant decision ever rendered by the
Supreme Court. Here for the first time in history a majority of the Court indicates its
conviction that academic freedom is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of
the Constitution against encroachment by either the federal or state governments.
Robert K. Carr, Academic Freedom, the American Association of University Professors, and the United States
Supreme Court, 45 AAUP Bull 5, 17 (1959).
29. Byrne, 99 Yale LJ 251 (cited in note I), presents the fullest discussion of the relationship
between the AAUP definition and the constitutional definition of academic freedom. Metzger, 66
Tex L Rev 1265 (cited in note 1), provides an excellent taxonomy of these two definitions while
emphasizing how they differ rather than how they relate. See especially id at 1267.
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academic freedom to professors as well as to universities, and have extended
it to teachers in public schools and to students generally without considering
how its meaning might differ in these various contexts.3 0 In my opinion, a
convincing justification for constitutional academic freedom requires a
thorough comparison of general first amendment theories with nonlegal
theories of academic freedom, yielding conclusions about where these various
theories do and do not overlap.3 ' I do not attempt such an ambitious task
here. But some conception of constitutional academic freedom is necessary to
analyze the relationship between the individual academic freedom of the
professor and the institutional academic freedom of the university, which is
the primary concern of this article. I therefore do consider reasons for
protecting academic freedom under the first amendment.
Fitting academic freedom within the rubric of the first amendment is in
many respects an extremely difficult challenge. The term "academic
freedom," in obvious contrast to "freedom of the press," is nowhere
mentioned in the text of the first amendment. It is inconceivable that those
who debated and ratified the first amendment thought about academic
freedom. Indeed, before the Civil War, when most institutions of higher
education were denominational colleges, "the problem of academic freedom
as we now understand it was hardly posed"3 2 even as a nonlegal matter.
These colleges were what the subsequent 1915 Declaration labeled
"proprietary," concerned with conserving truth rather than with searching for
it. They did not allow intellectual freedom, and their faculties typically did
not seek it. Notions of academic freedom, to the extent they existed at all,
were associated with institutional autonomy from the democratic vulgarity of
the broader society. Only with the emergence of the modern research
university in the late nineteenth century did a comprehensive theory of
academic freedom, expressed most thoroughly in the 1915 Declaration,
emerge in the United States. It took an "educational revolution 33 following
the Civil War to produce the commitment to critical inquiry central to the
modern rationale for academic freedom, 3 4 and arguably related to general
free speech theories contained within the first amendment. "It may put some
of our current difficulties into perspective," wrote the authors of the leading
history of American academic freedom just before the Supreme Court gave
the term constitutional meaning, "that the academic freedom which is now
30. See Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1291-1322 (cited in note 1); Rabban, Academic Freedom at 12
(cited in note 1). Professor Metzger offers a particularly thorough analysis of the many contexts in
which the Supreme Court has considered academic freedom claims. In my opinion, he provides a
more coherent synthesis and rationale for the Court's decisions addressing academic freedom and
free speech at schools and universities than the justices themselves intended or than the cases allow.
31. One obvious difference between the professional and constitutional definitions of academic
freedom is that the first amendment, through its incorporation in the 14th amendment, applies only
to state action. The professional definition of academic freedom, by contrast, has no state action
requirement.
32. Richard Hofstadter & Walter P. Metzger, Preface, v, to Walter P. Metzger, Academic Freedom in
the Age of the University (Columbia, 1961) ("Age of the University").
33. Id at vi.
34. Id at v-vi; Metzger, Age of the University at 42-44 (cited in note 32).
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under fire is not an ancient prerogative but an acquisition of relatively recent
date."3 5
A constitutional theory of academic freedom, moreover, understandably
implies to many a special first amendment right unique to professors and
universities. The free speech guaranteed by the first amendment is generally
thought to apply equally to all citizens.3 6 Indeed, even the specific protection
for the press provided in a separate clause of the first amendment has been
read as providing no greater rights to publishers and journalists than the free
speech clause guarantees other citizens.3 7 In these historical and legal
circumstances, it would not have been surprising had the Supreme Court
refused to recognize a discrete though unenumerated first amendment right
of academic freedom. Even those who defend the extension of first
amendment protection to academic freedom would have had difficulty
criticizing the Court had it declined to do so.
The AAUP itself, based on more pragmatic concerns, was divided about
whether to seek constitutional protection for academic freedom. It decided
not to submit an amicus brief in Sweezy, in part because it reasonably
concluded that the Court was unlikely to address the constitutional
implications of academic freedom for the first time,38 but also because it
worried about judicial appropriation of a concept the AAUP had largely
defined and successfully advocated throughout the academic world. Even a
favorable definition of academic freedom under the first amendment would be
subject to further judicial interpretation. What the Court gave, many within
the AAUP worried, it could also take away. Relatedly, constitutional
recognition of academic freedom could prompt many within the university
community to abandon any continuing independent effort to define and refine
this crucial concept. The constitutional meaning of academic freedom could
displace rather than complement the one set forth in the 1915 Declaration
and accepted in the institutional regulations of many universities. Principles
of academic freedom not incorporated into the first amendment could thereby
be abandoned entirely. For these reasons, many within the AAUP feared that
academic freedom would be weakened through judicial constitution-
alization.39
By identifying academic freedom as a first amendment right, the Supreme
Court in Sweezy rendered moot the AAUP's reservations about whether to
argue for this position. Subsequent decisions, including one that denied a
professor's first amendment claim, 40 have reinforced the incorporation of
35. Hofstadter & Metzger, Preface at vi (cited in note 32).
36. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U Chi L
Rev 20 (1975).
37. See text accompanying notes 93-97.
38. Dissenting in a previous case, Justice Douglas objected that a New York law would "raise
havoc with academic freedom," but he did not suggest that academic freedom had constitutional
dimensions. Adler v Board of Educ., 342 US 485, 509 (1952) (Douglas dissenting).
39. Carr, 45 AAUP Bull at 5, 6, 19-20 (cited in note 28).
40. Barenblatt, 360 US at 112.
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academic freedom into the first amendment, mostly through additional
rhetorical flourishes. Yet some language in Supreme Court decisions
suggests the reasoning behind this incorporation, often using terms that echo
the 1915 Declaration and indicate close parallels between the justification for
academic freedom in the 1915 Declaration and basic themes of general first
amendment theory.
One paragraph of Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion in Sweezy
contains the Court's fullest discussion of academic freedom.
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-
evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No
field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot
yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.
4
'
This crucial paragraph, though not very helpful in clarifying the relationship
between the new constitutional analysis of academic freedom and its
traditional meaning within the university community, does seem to identify
two distinct social benefits of academic freedom. Critical inquiry within
universities is essential to the preservation of a democratic society and, as a
somewhat independent matter, promotes discoveries and understanding
necessary for civilization. Justice Frankfurter's famous concurring opinion in
Sweezy reiterated both themes. Frankfurter invoked democratic values by
stressing "the dependence of a free society on free universities,- 42 but
focused primarily on knowledge and understanding in the full range of
academic disciplines as social goods in themselves. Any "government
intrusion into the intellectual life of a university," Frankfurter twice warned, 43
would jeopardize these essential functions of professors in universities.
The Court's next significant discussion of academic freedom under the
first amendment, a decade later in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, quoted the key
paragraph from the plurality opinion in Sweezy while emphasizing that
academic freedom is "a special concern of the First Amendment, which does
not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." In
describing academic freedom as "a transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned," the Court in Keyishian observed that the
"classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' " The future of the
country, for reasons the Court did not elaborate, "depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
41. Sweezy, 354 US at 250.
42. Id at 262. In an earlier concurrence that did not refer specifically to academic freedom,
Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion joined by Justice Douglas, referred to teachers as "the priests of
our democracy." Frankfurter emphasized "the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-
mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens." Vieman v Updegraff, 344
US 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter concurring).
43. Sweezy, 354 US at 261, 262.
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discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind
of authoritative selection.' "44
These passages in Sweezy and Keyishian, though relatively brief and allusive,
still remain the Court's fullest discussions of constitutional academic freedom.
Like the 1915 Declaration, they emphasized the social importance of critical
inquiry in universities in promoting knowledge and serving democratic values.
Both the Supreme Court and the 1915 Declaration maintained that the search
for truth, in universities as well as in society generally, is never complete and
requires free debate about competing ideas that precludes any imposition of
ideological orthodoxy. The judicial opinions and the 1915 Declaration even
used similar metaphors. The description of the university in the 1915
Declaration as an "intellectual experiment station" closely resembles the
description of the classroom in Keyishian as a "marketplace of ideas." Indeed,
just as the 1915 Declaration stressed that universities should allow "ideas
distasteful to the community as a whole" to "germinate" and perhaps
ultimately to become generally accepted, 45 Justice Holmes, who created the
marketplace metaphor for the first amendment invoked by the Court in
Keyishian, stressed that society should allow "the expression of opinions that
we loathe" because "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market." 46
The Court's use of the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor in Keyishian also
underlined its view, apparent throughout its decisions, that its general free
speech jurisprudence-particularly in relation to the search for knowledge
and truth and to the key role of free expression in a democracy-applies to
the specific context of academic freedom in universities. The Court in
Keyishian reiterated in its crucial paragraph identifying academic freedom as
"a special concern of the First Amendment" that the "vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools." This language strengthened the Court's identification of
academic freedom with general first amendment values while exacerbating
ambiguities about the relationship between them. 47
The early Supreme Court opinions referring to academic freedom left
many questions unanswered. The Court never clarified the relationships
among the "special" constitutional right of academic freedom it read into the
first amendment, the concept of academic freedom expressed in the 1915
Declaration and broadly accepted within American universities, and the
general first amendment right of free speech. Despite significant parallels,
these three concepts also contained differences. For example, the focus in the
1915 Declaration on the special training and competence of professors, and
44. 385 US 589, 603 (1967).
45. 1915 Declaration at 167-68; Appendix A at 400 (cited in note 6).
46. Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1920) (Holmes dissenting).
47. 385 US at 603, quoting Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479, 487 (1960). Without referring to
academic freedom,Justice Frankfurter similarly emphasized in a previous case that teachers bring the
safeguards for freedom of speech, inquiry, and thought in the first amendment "vividly into
operation." lVieman, 344 US at 195 (Frankfurter concurring).
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the corresponding importance of peer review to academic freedom, found no
echo in Supreme Court opinions. The "marketplace of ideas" metaphor,
though in some respects analogous to characterizing the university as an
"intellectual experiment station," implies an equality of discourse appropriate
in discussions of political ideas by citizens but insensitive to the relevant
differences in expertise between professors and students in the classroom.48
Numerous general principles of first amendment analysis, moreover, might
have little or no relevance to the university context, or might even interfere
with legitimate educational decisions by universities based on the content of
speech.49
IV
A FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The Supreme Court's brief discussions of academic freedom, whatever
their analytical shortcomings and lingering ambiguities, reveal sufficient
parallels between academic freedom and the first amendment generally to
justify, even if not to require, the Court's constitutionalization of academic
freedom as "a special concern of the First Amendment." 50  Analyzing
academic freedom in terms of the distinctive functions of professors and
universities, which is the method of the 1915 Declaration, helps explain, as
the Supreme Court never has, the sense in which the academic freedom
incorporated into the first amendment is not simply synonymous with the free
speech clause. This approach, essentially in agreement with Professor Van
Alstyne's classic article, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General
Issue of Civil Liberty, views the speech of professors on matters within their
expertise as subject to both greater and lesser constitutional protection than
the general speech of all citizens, including speech by professors that does not
relate to professional issues. 5'
As the 1915 Declaration emphasized, the basic function of professors in
universities-critical inquiry on subjects within their scholarly expertise and
the dissemination of the results of their scholarship through teaching and
publication-requires freedom from constraints that threaten the
independence essential to performing this function. Such constraints would
deny the general public the contribution to knowledge and democracy that
academic work provides. These social benefits, which the Supreme Court
recognized as fundamental first amendment values in Sweezy and Keyishian
without tying them in detail to the actual functions of professors in
48. See Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 296-97 (cited in note 1).
49. See text accompanying notes 110, 124-25 (discussing emphasis by justice Stevens on limited
applicability of content neutrality in university context).
50. Keyishian, 385 US at 603.
51. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom (cited in note 22). Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at
263-65 (cited in note 1), agrees with Professor Van Alstyne's distinction between free speech and
academic freedom.
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universities, justify academic freedom under the first amendment as well as
under the nonlegal analysis of the 1915 Declaration.
The requirement of scholarly independence for the proper performance of
academic work entitles the professor to more freedom from employer control
than enjoyed by the typical employee. It makes no sense to expect professors
to engage in critical inquiry and simultaneously to allow punishment for its
exercise. 52  First amendment academic freedom should preclude an
administrator or trustee at a public university from forcing a professor to
investigate a particular topic or to reach specified conclusions. 53 Conceivably,
constitutional academic freedom might even protect professors at both public
and private universities from laws that would apply to other citizens. 54 The
owner of a movie theater could be punished for showing a film declared
obscene by a jury in his community though protected by juries elsewhere, but
a professor at the adjacent university might have an academic freedom right
to show the same film in an advanced course on the regulation of mass media
to make the intellectual point that the definition of obscenity involves close
questions on which community standards vary. 55
On the other hand, a professor speaking within his field of expertise may
be disciplined without violating constitutional academic freedom for speech
that otherwise would be protected under the free speech clause of the first
amendment. "The price of an exceptional vocational freedom to speak the
truth as one sees it," Professor Van Alstyne astutely observes, "is the cost of
exceptional care in the representation of that 'truth,' a professional standard
of care." 56 Grossly inaccurate speech about the Holocaust, for example,
could be cause for dismissing a historian for incompetence, but not for taking
any adverse action against a professor in the school of engineering or an
employee of the municipal utility commission.57
52. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom at 77 (cited in note 22).
53. Id at 75.
54. An attempt to enforce a law provides the state action that invokes the first amendment at
private as well as public universities.
55. The AAUP filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court of Florida challenging a lower court
decision that upheld the seizure of the film "Deep Throat" from a professor of mass communications
who had presented an optional viewing to students. The professor showed the movie to give
students a "common frame of reference for debate, analogous to what ajury or appellate court might
face in deliberating upon the obscenity of a particular work." Roberts v State, 373 S2d 672, 674 (Fla
1979). The AAUP claimed that even if the film were obscene, and therefore unprotected by the
speech clause of the first amendment, the independent first amendment right of academic freedom
safeguarded the professor from state action. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae at 20-25, Roberts v State,
373 S2d 672 (Fla 1979). The Supreme Court of Florida found that the film was seized in violation of
state law, and thus did not reach the constitutional question. 373 S2d at 674. Van Alstyne, The
Specific Theory of Academic Freedom at 77-78 (cited in note 22), anticipated such a case.
56. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom at 76 (cited in note 22).
57. In 1977, a professor of electrical engineering at Northwestern University wrote a book
entitled The Hoax of the Twentieth Century, asserting that reports of the systematic killing ofJews in Nazi
concentration camps were a myth promoted by Zionists to create support for a Jewish state in
Palestine. Responding to protests about the university's failure to condemn the professor, its
provost stated: "A faculty member's right to have his writing published is not an academic freedom
issue. It is a right available to any citizen of the United States under the first amendment of the
Constitution. It is a shame when that right is used to insult survivors of concentration camps." Ellen
E. Coughlin, Professor's Book on Holocaust Attacked at Northwestern U., Chron Higher Educ 6 (February 7,
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Constitutional academic freedom thus may provide professors more
protection for professional speech and less protection for unprofessional
speech than the free speech clause would afford the same statements by
nonacademics. Yet using the professional functions of professors to justify
constitutional academic freedom means that their expressions on matters
unrelated to professional concerns, though possibly covered by the free
speech clause, have no status under this "special" first amendment right. An
engineer who writes about the Holocaust or who shows a film declared
obscene by a local jury has no different first amendment rights than other
citizens, because neither expression by the engineer concerns his professional
expertise.
This constitutional analysis deviates from the controversial position of the
1915 Declaration, subsequently reiterated by recent scholars, 58 that the
protection of academic freedom should include the extramural speech of
professors on subjects outside their academic specialties. Though the drafters
of the 1915 Declaration reached this conclusion under the pressure of cases in
which universities fired professors for such extramural statements, they
apparently relied on a theoretical justification for their pragmatic position.
Institutional neutrality, they implied, is the logical counterpart to the faculty
independence protected by academic freedom. If faculty cannot be made to
answer to the directives of administrators and trustees, then administrators
and trustees should not be held responsible for what the faculty says. 59
This approach, however, has a serious weakness under the logic of the
1915 Declaration itself. The 1915 Declaration repeatedly stressed that
academic freedom is justified by the social contributions of expert and
independent scholars. When professors do not speak as scholars, therefore,
they are not engaging in speech to which academic freedom should apply.
The value of institutional neutrality as a distinctive norm stresses that
universities should not be held responsible for the aprofessional speech of
professors, whether or not such speech is protected by law. 60 Institutional
neutrality, however, relates to academic freedom only to the extent that a
1977). See Seth S. King, Professor Stirs Furor by Saying Nazis' Slaying ofJews is a Myth, New York Times
A10 (January 28, 1977) (similar story); Walter Goodman, Tenets of Tenure, New York Times A22
(February 23, 1977) (editorial) (asserting that this professor was appropriately protected by tenure
because he was not accused "of carrying out his appointed duties invidiously or incompetently").
58. See, for example, John R. Searle, Two Concepts of Academic Freedom, in Edmund L. Pincoffs, ed,
The Concept of Academic Freedom 86-96 (cited in note 22).
59. The norm of institutional neutrality in the 1915 Declaration, though implicit throughout the
document, is made explicit by Metzger, 66 Tex L Rev at 1280-81 (cited in note 1).
60. During World War I, President Lowell of Harvard risked the loss of a $10 million bequest by
refusing to deprive an openly pro-German professor of his chair. "Either the university assumes full
responsibility for permitting its professors to express certain opinions in public," Lowell wrote in his
annual report, "or it assumes no responsibility whatever, and leaves them to be dealt with like other
citizens by the public authorities according to the laws of the land." Metzger, The Age of the University
at 228-29 (cited in note 32). Professor Metzger, following the AAUP conception of academic
freedom, understandably views Lowell's moral courage as a rare defense of academic freedom during
World War I. Id at 228. But I agree with Professor Van Alstyne that in this statement "Lowell was
himself making an implicit distinction between alleged abuses of academic freedom (for which
Harvard would doubtless admit its responsibility of review of its own faculty) and alleged abuses of
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professor's speech, inside or outside the university, concerns a matter of
professional expertise.
Whatever one's view about the application of academic freedom by the
1915 Declaration to the aprofessional extramural speech of professors,
additional barriers to protecting such speech arise under a constitutional
definition of academic freedom. The drafters of the 1915 Declaration did not
have to address the free speech rights of other occupations. They could easily
have conceded that the neutrality they urged for universities should also apply
to other institutions, while adding that this issue was beyond the appropriate
concern of the 1915 Declaration, which focused on the role of university
professors. Yet the free speech clause of the first amendment, unlike the 1915
Declaration, covers the speech of all citizens. If academic freedom has a
special meaning under the first amendment, it must be distinguished from the
general free speech clause. The distinctive professional functions of
professors provide the basis for applying a special first amendment concept to
them. But what is the first amendment justification for treating the
aprotessional speech of professors differently from the speech of anyone else?
The only plausible justification is that the line between professional and
aprofessional speech may be controversial, and that protection for clearly
aprofessional speech is needed to give "breathing room" to the professional
speech that is the special subject of academic freedom. Such a drastic
prophylactic rule is unnecessary and would be likely to generate more
resentment against the "special pleading" of professors than even a narrow
and convincing conception of academic freedom inevitably does. A generous
definition of professional speech is a feasible and better response to this
legitimate concern.
There are legitimate first amendment reasons for protecting the political
speech of public employees generally. Indeed, the Supreme Court has done
so while rejecting the "right/privilege" distinction popularized by Holmes.
But as the Supreme Court has recognized, it is the free speech clause, not the
special first amendment right of academic freedom, that provides the
constitutional basis for this protection. 6'
V
HINTS OF JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF A SPECIFIC THEORY OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The Supreme Court has not explicitly distinguished the specific theory of
academic freedom from the general protection of the first amendment, and
often refers interchangeably to academic freedom and the right to political
expression. Yet, as a number of recent lower court decisions indicate, the
judicial application of a specific theory of academic freedom would require
free speech and the general issue of civil liberty." Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom
at 80 (cited in note 22).
61. See Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom at 68-70, 80-81 (cited in note 22).
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only an elaboration, rather than a reversal, of the current undifferentiated
approach. For example, cases involving the rejection of Marxist candidates
for appointment have observed that universities violate academic freedom by
discharging or refusing to hire a professor "because of his or her political,
philosophical, or ideological beliefs." 62 Typically, these cases did not attempt
to identify whether the Marxist speech related to academic or political issues.
The opinions did reflect, however, the conclusion that the professors' Marxist
views are protected by the first amendment in both contexts. It would not be
difficult for courts to refine this approach by applying the specific theory of
academic freedom to Marxist speech by professors on professional matters,
and general first amendment principles to Marxist speech by professors on
aprofessional, political issues.
Some decisions, moreover, have protected the specifically academic
speech of professors. The first case produced by the recent wave of
institutional policies on offensive speech focused on their impact in the
classroom. For example, a teaching assistant in a course entitled
"Comparative Animal Behavior" wanted to include as a topic in his discussion
group the hypothesis that biological differences account for the greater ability
of men than of women to perform certain mental tasks based on spatial
relationships. The teaching assistant argued, and the judge agreed, that some
students and teachers would regard this theory as sexist and that its
presentation could subject him to prosecution for harassment under
applicable university policies. Without referring explicitly to academic
freedom, the judge held that the university policies violated the first
amendment. 63
Other cases do cite academic freedom in addressing the first amendment
protection for academic speech and seem at least implicitly to recognize a
distinction between academic freedom and general free speech under the first
amendment. Judge Posner indicated that first amendment academic freedom
may give professors more protection than the first amendment provides to
members of the general public. He reasoned that professors may express
ideas in places on campus that are not public forums and from which
members of the general public may therefore be excluded. 6 4 Another judge
identified more directly a distinction between academic freedom and general
first amendment rights. He based his finding of a general first amendment
violation on the university's failure to renew the appointment of a Marxist
professor due to his aprofessional speech and associations: his belief in
communism and his membership in the Progressive Labor Party. This
conclusion allowed the judge to finesse the university's claim that it acted
because the professor inappropriately injected Marxism into the classroom.
62. Oilman v Toll, 518 F Supp 1196, 1202 (D Md 1981), aft'd, 704 F2d 139 (4th Cir 1983);
Franklin v Atkins, 409 F Supp 439, 445 (D Colo 1976), aff'd, 562 F2d 1188 (10th Cir 1977). Both
opinions borrowed this language from Justice Douglas's dissent in Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US
564, 581 (1972).
63. Doe v University of Michigan, 721 F Supp 852, 860, 864-67 (ED Mich 1989).
64. Piarowski v Illinois Community College Dist., 759 F2d 625, 629-31 (7th Cir 1985).
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The judge assumed, without deciding, that teaching history from a Marxist
orientation would be covered under the first amendment's protection of
academic freedom, especially given the fact that other professors in the
university's history department taught their courses from various competing
perspectives.65
Another judge implicitly acknowledged the added limitations on
professors imposed by a specific theory of academic freedom. A faculty
member claimed that the department of political science denied him tenure
because he had associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. In a separate
opinion, Judge Kaufman criticized the majority for assuming, without
deciding, that this association is protected by the first amendment. According
to Judge Kaufman, the candidate's behavior in covertly providing to the CIA
information he gathered during academic trips abroad cast legitimate doubt
on his commitment to the goals and principles of scholarship, threatened the
scholarly pursuits of his colleagues, and unjustifiably inhibited departmental
collegiality. Judge Kaufman did not address the relationship between the first
amendment and academic freedom. Yet his reasoning closely parallels
Professor Van Alstyne's more fully elaborated position that the social value of
critical inquiry justifying constitutional protection for individual academic
freedom may constrain professors in ways that would be left unrestricted by
the application of the general first amendment rights of speech and
association to other citizens. 6 6
These recent judicial opinions identify the importance of academic speech
by professors, occasionally distinguish it from speech in other contexts, and
recognize that it may be subject to both greater and lesser protection than the
first amendment usually provides. They are cause for optimism that courts
can develop a coherent and convincing specific conception of constitutional
academic freedom under the first amendment that differs from the free speech
rights all citizens possess.
VI
CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM As A SPECIFIC INSTANCE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The distinctive functions of professors and universities provide a
convincing justification for the Court's ambiguous incorporation of academic
freedom as "a special concern" of the first amendment. Yet special treatment
for a particular occupation or institution, even if analytically sound under
general first amendment principles, creates understandable skepticism,
especially given the accurate perception that citizens have rights to equal
protection under the first amendment. The argument for a constitutional
right of academic freedom can be substantially strengthened by viewing it not
65. Cooper v Ross, 472 F Supp 802, 813-14 (ED Ark 1979).
66. Selzer v Fleisher, 629 F2d 809, 814-17 (2d Cir 1980) (Kaufman concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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primarily as a special right unique to professors, but as a specific application
of the broader principle that the institutional context of speech often has first
amendment significance. Under this approach, constitutional academic
freedom is simply a convenient name to describe special speech rules
governed by the functions of professors and universities, just as other special
speech rules, which may not have been separately named, are required by the
distinctive yet different functions of institutions as varied as prisons, libraries,
the military, the civil service, public schools, and the media.
A. Tinker and Its Progeny
The role of institutional context in first amendment interpretation, though
made clear by many Supreme Court decisions, has not been sufficiently
highlighted in first amendment theory.6 7  The Court's most explicit
recognition of institutional context occurred in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, a case upholding the right of junior and senior high
school students to wear black armbands to protest American involvement in
Vietnam. The Court reasoned that the first amendment rights of teachers and
students, which they do not "shed . ..at the schoolhouse gate," must be
"applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. '- 68
While stressing the legitimate need of school officials to punish speech that
interferes with educational functions, the Court did not find any evidence in
the record that wearing the armbands would cause such interference. The
Court insisted that "a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint" did not constitute a sufficient
reason to give students lesser first amendment rights in the school
environment than elsewhere. 69
While some cases, like Tinker itself, conclude in a particular factual setting
that the "special characteristics" of an institution do not require any
modification of general first amendment rights, 70 other cases, frequently
citing Tinker, have emphasized that first amendment protections vary with
institutional context. Decisions make clear, for example, that the functions of
67. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and TheorY of the Public Forum,
34 UCLA L Rev 1713 (1987), is a major exception. Professor Post stresses that the government can
regulate speech to achieve the effective functioning of its own institutions. See also C. Edwin Baker,
Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U Miami L Rev 819, 824 (1980) (asserting first
amendment's press clause can be interpreted "as granting special constitutional protection to a
particular institution, the press"); Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights:
The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 Tex L Rev 1, 10 1-02 (1990) (arguing communal as well
as individual interests should be weighed in evaluating claims that institutional functions require
constraints on speech).
68. Tinker v Des Moines School Dist., 393 US 503, 506 (1969).
69. Id at 509. In his dissent, Justice Black disagreed with the majority's characterization of the
record. Citing specific incidents, Black claimed that the record contained overwhelming evidence
that the armbands "took the students' minds off their classwork and diverted them to thoughts about
the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam war." Id at 518.
70. See, for example, Wood v Georgia, 370 US 375, 393-94 (1962) (sheriff's job responsibilities in
administration ofjustice do not impose fewer first amendment rights than other citizens to criticize
judicial behavior; no evidence suggests sheriff's criticisms interfered with proper performance of his
official functions).
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the media and libraries require substantial scope for the exercise of free
expression, while the functions of the military and prisons justify restrictions
on speech citizens otherwise enjoy.
Two cases since Tinker illustrate that its focus on "the special
characteristics of the school environment" can limit as well as protect the first
amendment rights of students. While reiterating that tolerance of divergent
views are among the fundamental democratic values schools should
inculcate, 7' the Court has held that "pervasive sexual innuendo" 72 in a
student speech at a high school assembly could sufficiently "undermine the
school's basic educational mission"73 to justify the student's suspension. This
"vulgar and lewd" 74 language occurred during a speech nominating another
student for an office in the school's student government. The Court
acknowledged that the first amendment would protect the identical speech
uttered by an adult during a political campaign, but denied that "the same
latitude must be permitted to children in a public school." '75
In a subsequent case, the Court upheld the decision by a high school
principal to censor from a school newspaper stories dealing with pregnancy
and divorce. The Court reasoned that the first amendment does not apply to
"school-sponsored expressive activities" if the actions by the school
authorities "are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. '"76
Emphasizing that the standards for student speech disseminated under school
auspices legitimately "may be higher than those demanded by some
newspaper publishers or theatrical producers in the 'real' world,"' 77 the Court
upheld the principal's conclusion that the student editors had failed to follow
sound journalistic practices regarding the treatment of controversial issues
and the need to protect personal privacy. 78
The Court has relied on the special characteristics of several other
institutions to limit first amendment rights. In denying protection to antiwar
speech at a military base, the Court reasoned that "the different character of
the military community and of the military mission requires a different
application" of the first amendment. The fundamental military requirements
of obedience and discipline, the Court added, "may render permissible within
the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it." 7 9
71. Bethel School Dist. v Fraser, 478 US 675, 681 (1986).
72. Id at 683.
73. Id at 685.
74. Id.
75. Id at 682.
76. Hazelwood School Dist. v Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260, 273 (1988). The Court distinguished the
school-sponsored student expression in Hazelwood from the nonsponsored student expression in
Tinker. Id at 272-73.
77. Id at 272.
78. Id at 276. Dissenting, Justice Brennan asserted that the school "censorship served no
legitimate pedagogical purpose." Id at 289.
79. Parker v Levy, 417 US 733, 758 (1974). The Court subsequently cited the military interest in
troop readiness in rejecting a first amendment challenge to regulations requiring Air Force
personnel to receive approval from their commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force
bases. Brown v Glines, 444 US 348 (1980).
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The Court similarly has held that a prison inmate retains first amendment
rights only to the extent that they "are not inconsistent with his status as a
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system. '"80 Upholding regulations forbidding press interviews with individual
inmates, the Court observed that under prior, less restrictive rules, inmates
who were interviewed gained notoriety and influence within the prison and
became severe disciplinary problems. 8 '
In a context far less generally restrictive than a military base or a prison,
the Court also relied on special institutional functions to reject a first
amendment attack on prohibitions in the Hatch Act 82 against active
participation by civil servants in partisan political activities. The Court agreed
with the legislative judgment that these prohibitions are justified by the valid
purposes of preventing improper influence and corruption while preserving
efficient and effective government services.83
On the other hand, a Court plurality has cited the emphasis in Tinker on
institutional context to provide greater first amendment rights in a school
library than in a classroom. A local school board cannot remove books from a
school library, the opinion reasoned, because "the special characteristics of
the school library make that environment especially appropriate for the
recognition of the first amendment rights of students."84 In response to the
school board's claimed discretion to inculcate community values, the plurality
highlighted "the unique role of the school library." The opinion
distinguished "the compulsory environment of the classroom," where
absolute discretion by the board in determining curriculum might be justified
by its inculcative functions, from "the regime of voluntary inquiry" that
characterizes the school library, where inculcation is not appropriate. 85
Without contrasting the distinctive aspects of the classroom and the library,
Justice Blackmun observed in his concurrence that "the unique environment
of the school" both allows and limits the immunity of school officials from first
amendment restraints. The inculcative functions of schools, Blackmun
concluded, must be reconciled with commitment to "diversity of thought,"
which is itself a social value that schools should inculcate, and which is
protected by the "first amendment's bar on 'prescriptions of orthodoxy.' "86
B. Media Cases
Without citing Tinker, the Court has relied on the distinctive functions of
the media in extending broad first amendment rights. The Court held that a
legislative ban on editorializing by noncommercial educational broadcasting
80. Pell v Procunier, 417 US 817, 822 (1974).
81. Id at 831-32. Saxbe v W1ashington Post Co., 417 US 843 (1974), reaches the same conclusion.
82. 5 USC § 7324(a)(2) (1989).
83. United States Civil Serv. Comm ni v 'Vational Ass 'n of Letter Carriers, 413 US 548, 564-67 (1973).
84. Board of Educ. v Pico, 457 US 853, 868 (1982) (emphasis in original). Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens formed the plurality.
85. Id at 869.
86. Id at 879.
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stations, though enacted with the laudable aim of preventing them from
becoming agencies of government propaganda, violated the first amendment.
According to the Court, these stations require first amendment protection of
"journalistic freedom" in order to serve their function of informing the
public.8 7
Numerous judicial decisions, sometimes relying on the first amendment
generally and sometimes citing its press clause specifically, have similarly
attributed constitutional significance to the special role of newspapers in
contributing to the discussion of public affairs.88 After several concurring and
dissenting opinions by other members of the Court supported press efforts to
enter prisons, 9 Chief Justice Burger wrote a plurality opinion granting the
general public and the press an equal first amendment right of access to a
criminal trial.90 In the previous prison cases, the Court majority had observed
with approval that, as a matter of practice, the press has enjoyed significantly
more access than members of the general public to prisons and prisoners.
These cases, however, rejected claims that the first amendment mandates such
a result.9 ' In requiring press and public access to a criminal trial, Burger also
took judicial notice of separate press rights such as special seating and priority
of entry. Going beyond the simple judicial approval of extra access by the
press in the prison cases, Burger tied the favorable treatment of the press to
first amendment concerns. He made the historical point that public
knowledge of criminal trials, which once came from personal observation or
word of mouth, is now generally received through print and electronic
journalism. This historical transformation, Burger maintained, "validates the
media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public." In this important
sense, the media make a unique contribution to public understanding of the
criminal justice system.9 2
Although Chief Justice Burger clearly viewed special treatment of the
press, justified by its institutional function of informing the public, as serving
87. FCC v League of Women Voters of California, 468 US 364, 397-99, 402 (1984).
88. See, for example, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v Minnesota Comm 'r of Revenue, 460 US 575
(1983) (emphasizing importance of an explicit guarantee of freedom of the press in Constitution, id
at 584; threat of differential taxation of press can operate "effectively as a censor to check critical
comment by the press, undercutting the basic assumption of our political system that the press will
often serve as an important restraint on government," id at 585); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v
Tornillo, 418 US 241, 258 (1974) ("First Amendment guarantees of a free press" preclude
government regulation of "exercise of editorial control and judgment" regarding "treatment of
public issues and public officials"); Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 US 333, 350 (1966) (press subjects entire
criminal process to "public scrutiny and criticism"); Mills v Alabama, 384 US 214 (1966) (emphasizing
consensus that major purpose of first amendment is "to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs," id at 218-19; first amendment has "specifically selected the press ... to play an important
role in the discussion of public affairs," id).
89. See, for example, Houchins v KQED, Inc., 438 US 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart concurring); id at 19
(Stevens dissenting); Saxbe v Washington Post Co., 417 US 843, 850 (1974) (Powell dissenting); Pell, 417
US at 835 (Powell concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 836 (Douglas dissenting).
90. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 448 US 555 (1980).
91. Saxbe, 417 US at 849-50; Pell, 417 US at 831 n8, 834-35.
92. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 US at 572-73, 577 n 12. Subsequent cases reiterated this point
while expanding press access. See, for example, Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Court, 478 US 1 (1986)
(recognizing qualified first amendment right of access to preliminary hearings).
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vital first amendment purposes, he took pains not to assert more first
amendment rights for the press than for the general public. This paradoxical
view is best revealed in opinions that anticipated Burger's approach while
advocating special press access to prisons. For example, Justice Powell cited
the "constitutionally established role of the news media" as justifying greater
access to prisons than is permitted the general public.9 3 Powell stressed that
it is "hopelessly unrealistic" for most citizens to obtain information about
important public issues without the assistance of the press, and referred to the
press as "an agent of the public," whose "underlying right" to information
requires special rules giving the press favored treatment.9 4 Yet Powell agreed
with the majority that the first amendment does "not create special privileges
for particular groups or individuals," including journalists. According to
Powell, "neither any news organization nor reporters as individuals have
constitutional rights superior to those enjoyed by ordinary citizens." 9 5
In another case, Justice Stewart also accepted the majority's position that
the first amendment does not "guarantee the press any basic right of access
superior to that of the public generally." Stewart added, however, that he,
unlike the majority, did not "view 'equal access' as meaning access that is
identical in all respects." Given the dependence of the general public on the
press for information, Stewart reasoned that "the concept of equal access
must be accorded more flexibility" to allow the press greater access than the
general public. 9 6 Restrictions reasonable for the general public, Stewart
claimed, may be unreasonable, and even unconstitutional, as applied to
journalists. Stewart supported his position by emphasizing the existence of a
separate press clause in the first amendment, which he considered "no
constitutional accident, but an acknowledgment of the critical role played by
the press in American society." 9 7
I find incoherent the view articulated in many of these opinions that the
institutional functions of the press recognized by the first amendment should
afford journalists special benefits, but that those benefits should not be
interpreted as giving the press a more favored position under the first
amendment. Justice Stewart's insistence that "equal" access does not mean
"identical" access highlights the problems with this view. Clearly
uncomfortable about recognizing additional first amendment rights not
generally available to the public, many justices apparently consider the
underlying public benefits justifying special press rights as negating any claim
that these rights reflect greater first amendment protection for journalists.
A more persuasive analysis would require overcoming the Court's
squeamishness about granting unique first amendment rights to a particular
profession. The Court should frankly acknowledge, as it seemed to suggest in
93. Saxbe, 417 US at 864 (Powell dissenting).
94, Id at 863-64.
95. Id at 857.
96. Houchins, 438 US at 16 (Stewart concurring).
97. Id at 17.
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a case prohibiting differential taxation of the press, 98 that special rights for the
press do constitute additional protection under the first amendment, and
justify that protection by the public benefits it freely acknowledges the press
performs. Just as the institutional functions of the military and the
corrections system permit restrictions on general first amendment rights, so
the institutional functions of the press should mandate greater first
amendment protection than other citizens enjoy. Whether restricting or
expanding general first amendment rights, the ultimate contribution to the
public derived from the effective operation of vital organizations justifies
these special rules tailored to different institutional purposes.
C. Institutional Context and the University
Cases constitutionalizing academic freedom also indicated that the
university is an institution in which first amendment rights have special
meaning. Chief Justice Warren's pivotal opinion in Sweezy emphasized "the
essentiality of freedom" in universities and recognized that "[s]cholarship
cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust." 99 The South
African statement quoted at length in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence
defined a university as "characterized by a spirit of free inquiry," whose
"business" is "to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation."' 0 0 Keyishian added that the university
"classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' " which cannot function
under "a pall of orthodoxy."10 1
More recent higher education cases have tied the intervening focus in
Tinker on the "special characteristics" of an institutional environment to the
earlier first amendment protection of academic freedom in Sweezy and
Keyishian. The two major Supreme Court decisions applying the Tinker
analysis to universities acknowledged that the distinctive institutional mission
of the university may justify fewer first amendment rights on campus than
citizens otherwise enjoy.'0 2 In both cases, however, the Court refused to find
such a justification and emphasized that in some respects the first amendment
has particular vitality in universities.
98. See Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 583-84 (referring to inclusion of an "explicit guarantee of
freedom of the press" as "substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have
troubled the Framers of the First Amendment").
Dissenting from the Court's refusal to grant a reporter's privilege against responding to a grand
jury subpoena, Justice Douglas more explicitly advocated special rights for the press. He urged an
absolute privilege for reporters based on the "preferred position" of the press "in our constitutional
scheme." This "preferred position," Douglas stressed, is not designed "to set newsmen apart as a
favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public's right to know." Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665,
721 (1972) (Douglas dissenting). See Baker, 34 U Miami L Rev at 829 (cited in note 67) (social
functions of the press "justify institutional rights beyond those already accorded by the free speech
doctrine").
99. 354 US at 250.
100. Id at 262-63.
101. 385 US at 603.
102. Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 267-68 n5 (1981); Healy vJames, 408 US 169, 180-81 (1972).
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Overturning the refusal of a college president to recognize a campus
chapter of Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS"), the Court in Healy v.
James found no evidence to support the president's conclusion that the
chapter posed a significant threat of disruption. The Court acknowledged
that the first amendment does not protect organizations that "infringe
reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education, "0 3 and remanded the
case for a determination of whether the local SDS chapter would commit itself
to following legitimate university regulations. 10 4 The majority implied what
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence made clear: "The government as employer
or school administrator may impose upon employees and students reasonable
regulations that would be impermissible if imposed by the government upon
all citizens."' 0 5 Yet the majority also warned against inferring from its
appreciation of the university's need for order any hint that first amendment
"protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the
community at large. Quite to the contrary," the Court added, invoking prior
decisions incorporating academic freedom within the first amendment, it is
particularly important to protect first amendment rights in universities. 0 6
In Widmar v. Vincent, a subsequent case upholding the right of a student
group to meet on campus, the Court emphasized that the special
characteristics of a university can permit restrictions on speech that would
violate the first amendment if applied in a public forum. The Court stressed
that a university's educational mission can justify "reasonable regulations
compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities." 107 Yet
the Court invalidated a university's rules prohibiting the use of its facilities by
an organization of evangelical Christian students. The university's
institutional mission of providing a "secular education,"1 0 8 the Court
concluded, was not sufficiently "compelling"' 1 9 to allow a content-based
exclusion of religious speech inconsistent with both the free exercise and the
free speech clauses of the first amendment.
Concurring, Justice Stevens went further and challenged the very
application of traditional first amendment concepts to the university setting.
He emphasized that universities, in "performing their learning and teaching
missions," routinely and appropriately make decisions based on the content
of speech, a suspect category in general first amendment jurisprudence.
Selecting the professors to appoint and reward, choosing the books to
purchase for the library, developing the curriculum, and allocating scarce
university resources and facilities among students groups all require
evaluation of the content of expressive activities. Legal terms such as
103. Healy, 408 US at 189.
104. Id at 194.
105. Id at 203 (Rehnquist concurring).
106. Id at 180-81.
107. 454 US 263, 268 n5.
108. Id at 268 (emphasis in original).
109. Id at 276.
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"compelling state interest" and "public forum," Stevens complained, not only
distract from the need to focus on the distinctive aspects of the university
environment, but "may needlessly undermine the academic freedom of public
universities."' 10
Even when asserting that the first amendment should apply with particular
force in the university, the Court has never suggested that members of the
university community may in some contexts have more first amendment
protection than the general public. At most, some of the Court's opinions
have indicated that restrictions on speech that may be appropriate for
younger students would violate the first amendment in the university context.
In determining the constitutionality of school regulations, the Court has cited
differences in the "emotional maturity" of students,"' and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, while advocating greater discretion for a school board than the
majority of his colleagues allowed, conceded that there are fewer inculcative
or pedagogical reasons to limit access to ideas in universities."t 2 For example,
Rehnquist distinguished "the broad ranging inquiry available to university
students" from the need for "an orderly exposure to relevant information" at
earlier stages of education." 13
Yet as in the press cases, it makes sense to assert that the functions of a
particular profession that benefit the general public can justify greater first
amendment protection than other citizens enjoy. Just as "journalistic
freedom""t 4 enables the media to make their distinctive professional
contribution to the public's first amendment right to learn about and criticize
government activities, academic freedom enables professors to serve the
public's first amendment interests in fostering critical inquiry and knowledge
vital to democracy and civilization. The Court cited these public benefits in
identifying academic freedom as a special right under the first amendment." 5
However, constitutionalizing academic freedom seems much less like elitist
favoritism for a particular profession when it is appropriately viewed as but
one example of the general proposition that first amendment principles vary
with institutional context.
Special first amendment protection for journalists and professors benefit
the public as much as special restrictions on the first amendment rights of
110. Id at 277-81. Concurring in Healy, Justice Rehnquist stressed that first amendment cases
dealing with criminal sanctions are largely inapplicable in cases where the government is the
employer or college administrator. First amendment cases, Rehnquist added, "are not fungible
goods." 408 US at 203.
111. Hazelwood, 484 US at 272. See also id at 271; Edwards v Aguillar, 482 US 578, 606-07 (1987)
(Powell concurring); Widmar, 454 US at 274 n14. The Supreme Court recently has declined to grant
a writ of certiorari in a case that relied on the differences between adult college students and minor
high school students to deny college administrators "the same broad discretion in controlling their
curriculum as school administrators at the elementary and secondary level." DiBona v Matthews, 220
Cal App3d 1329, 1346, 269 Cal Rptr 882, 892 (1990), cert denied, 59 USLW 3402 (No 90-598) (US
ed, December 3, 1990).
112. Pico, 457 US at 909, 914 (Rehnquist dissenting).
113. Id at 914.
114. See note 87 and accompanying text.
115. See notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
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prisoners and military personnel. Moreover, as a functional analysis of
academic freedom reveals,11 6 the same professional responsibilities that
justify additional first amendment rights of professors may also allow
limitations on their speech that do not apply to others. For example, a
professor who plagiarizes a scholarly paper may be disciplined for a gross
violation of professional ethics, while a prisoner, who in many respects has
fewer first amendment protections than other citizens, could probably not be
punished for copying verbatim the clemency petition of a fellow inmate.
Concern about creating additional first amendment rights for particular
professions also should be assuaged by the prevalence throughout the law of
legal protections based on distinctive job functions, even in expressive
contexts not explicitly covered by the first amendment. The speech or debate
clause of the Constitution gives legislators an absolute privilege for
statements made during legislative debates in order to protect the
independence of Congress as a separate branch of government.' 17 Absolute
common law privileges in defamation cases similarly protect judges,
legislators, and executive officers of government in the performance of
functions that ultimately benefit the public.'"i Relying on the first
amendment to give special protection to the speech of journalists and
professors that also benefits the public seems equally justifiable.
In retrospect, it may be unfortunate that the term academic freedom, with
its many and evolving connotations within the university community, became
constitutionalized. Conceptual confusion inevitably results when the same
term has different meanings in constitutional and academic discourse. The
difficulties in distinguishing constitutional academic freedom from general
free speech principles are exacerbated by the additional problem of
untangling constitutional from professional definitions of academic freedom.
It might have been wiser for the Court to have developed a separate term,
such as "academic speech," 1 19 to refer to distinctive first amendment rights in
the university context. Academic freedom, however, has acquired
constitutional significance. Rather than abandon this usage after more than a
generation, it makes more sense to focus on how constitutional academic
freedom, which can legitimately be considered an example of applying the
first amendment in institutional context, overlaps with and differs from both
professional definitions of academic freedom and general free speech
doctrines.
116. See notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
117. See, for example, Hutchinson v Proxmire, 443 US 11I (1979); United States v Brewster, 408 US
501 (1972); United States v Johnson, 383 US 169 (1966).
118. W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 815-23 (West, 5th ed 1984). 1 am grateful to
Guy Wellborn for suggesting the relevance of these privileges to analogous first amendment
protection based on the speaker's function.
119. See Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 258-61 (cited in note 1) (using "academic speech .. .to encompass
both scholarship and teaching").
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VII
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
While constitutionalizing academic freedom in Sweezy, Chief Justice
Warren's plurality opinion and Justice Frankfurter's concurrence tied the first
amendment values of critical inquiry and the search for knowledge to the
independence of both professors and universities from state intrusion. Yet a
distinctive conception of institutional academic freedom remained only latent
throughout the McCarthy-era cases, largely because they involved state
actions against individual lecturers and professors as in Sweezy and Keyishian
rather than direct conflicts between individuals and universities. More
recently, however, universities have relied on an institutional right of
academic freedom to defend themselves both against the state and against
students, professors, and members of the general public. These cases have
prompted the courts to consider in new contexts the institutional component
of academic freedom.1 20
Court opinions did not focus on institutional academic freedom until
1978, whenJustice Powell's opinion provided the fifth vote for the majority in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.12 1 Powell reiterated that
"[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."
He maintained that " 'the four essential freedoms' of a university," identified
in the South African statement quoted at length in Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Sweezy, "constitute academic freedom." A university,
according to the statement, must be able "to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study."' 122 The Court quoted this language from Sweezy
again in Widmar v. Vincent,12 3 and Justice Stevens, concurring in Widmar,
referred to "the academic freedom of public universities."' 124 Citing Sweezy
and Bakke, Justice Stevens stressed that educational decisions based on the
content of speech "should be made by academicians, not by federal
judges."' 125 Ironically, even while underlining the institutional component of
academic freedom, the Court in both Bakke and Widmar relied on
countervailing constitutional values to overrule the universities' decisions. 12 6
120. The Supreme Court protected the institutional autonomy of universities through other
doctrines before it constitutionalized academic freedom in Sweezy. See note 24.
121. 438 US 265 (1978).
122. Id at 312, citing Sweezy, 354 US at 263, citing The Open Universities in South Africa 10-12 (a
statement of a conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the University of
Witwatersrand).
123. 454 US at 276.
124. Id at 278 (Stevens concurring).
125. Id at 279. See also id at 279 n2.
126. In Bakke, Justice Powell emphasized that the challenged admissions program violated the
14th amendment by focusing "solely on ethnic diversity." 438 US at 315. He cited the admissions
program at Harvard College as an example that met 14th amendment requirements. Under
Harvard's program, "race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's
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Two important cases, Princeton University v. Schmid 127 and University of
Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,' 28 illustrate the range
of complicated issues raised by claims of institutional academic freedom.
After discussing these cases, I explore the possibility that institutional
academic freedom has a different meaning for state universities than for
private ones and discuss the relationship between state legislatures and the
universities they create.
A. Princeton University v. Schmid
A case at Princeton University first attracted substantial attention to the
potential tension between the developing judicial recognition of institutional
academic freedom and the individual academic freedom of professors that
historically had been the primary focus of this concept. Despite the objections
of many of its own faculty, Princeton relied on the first amendment to resist
any judicial review of its policies regulating access by outsiders to campus
facilities. The case arose when Chris Schmid, a member of the United States
Labor Party who had no affiliation with the university, distributed and sold on
the campus material dealing with the party and the mayoral campaign in
nearby Newark. Existing Princeton regulations prohibited any person without
a university connection or sponsorship from entering the campus to solicit
support or contributions. Schmid was arrested and convicted of trespass.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately held that new, more permissive
university regulations rendered the original dispute moot,'2 9 this litigation
generated an important debate about the meaning of institutional academic
freedom.
In overturning Schmid's conviction, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
relied on the free speech provision of the state constitution, which it
acknowledged to be "more sweeping in scope than the language of the first
amendment."' 130 Contrasting the state action requirement of the fourteenth
amendment, the court observed that the free speech rights in the New Jersey
Constitution are enforceable against private as well as public bodies.' 3 ' The
court recognized that the New Jersey Constitution also protects ownership of
private property, and viewed its task as balancing Princeton's property rights
against Schmid's expressive rights.
In analyzing these competing claims, the court revealed remarkable
sensitivity to the institutional context of campus speech. Citing Princeton's
own regulations lauding the importance of free inquiry and free speech in
file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available
seats." Id at 317. In Widmar, the majority and Justice Stevens agreed that the University's fear of
violating the establishment clause was unwarranted and thus could not justify its content-based
restriction on the first amendment rights of students denied a meeting place on campus. 454 US at
278; id at 280-81 (Stevens concurring).
127. 455 US 100 (1982).
128. 110 S Ct 577 (1990).
129. 455 US at 103.
130. State v Schmid, 84 NJ 535, 557, 423 A2d 615, 626 (1980).
131. Id at 565-66, 423 A2d at 631.
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achieving the university's declared purpose of promoting knowledge, the
court concluded that Schmid's presence on campus was "entirely consonant
with the University's expressed educational mission."13 2  The court
acknowledged that "needs, implicating academic freedom and development,
justify an educational institution in controlling those who seek to enter its
domain" and require substantial judicial deference to university "autonomy
and self-governance."'' 3 3  Yet it reversed Schmid's conviction because
Princeton's regulations contained no reasonable standards relating limitations
on expressive freedoms to legitimate educational goals. i3 4
In its jurisdictional statement to the United States Supreme Court,
Princeton complained that its academic freedom protected by the first
amendment was violated when the Supreme Court of New Jersey arrogated to
itself "the ancient right of a university community to determine how its
educational philosophy may best be implemented."'' 35  According to
Princeton, a private university's choice of educational philosophy, however
broad, orthodox, or eccentric, is immunized by first amendment academic
freedom from interference by the state. Princeton insisted that no
governmental body is constitutionally competent to determine whether a
private university has acted in accordance with its educational objectives.
Princeton conceded that "the university cannot claim its academic freedom as
a shield against state rules concerning health, safety and like matters," but
immediately added that correspondingly "the state cannot use its police
powers to control in any way the intellectual activities of the university."' 13 6
Princeton's main brief reiterated and elaborated this theme, asserting that
first amendment academic freedom provides greater protection to private
than to public universities. The educational judgments of public universities,
like those of private universities, are protected against interference from other
state entities. Public universities, however, are also subject to the constraints
on all government action imposed by the prohibitions in the first and
fourteenth amendments against the state's adoption of a particular religious
or ideological viewpoint. Princeton maintained that private universities, by
contrast, are absolutely unconstrained in their choice of educational
philosophy.' 3 7 Stressing "the interrelation of expressive and property
rights," Princeton made the historical observation that control by universities
over their property helped to provide an educational "atmosphere conducive
to learning and to the interchange of ideas between faculty and students." 38
That Princeton chose an expansive view of free expression on its campus, the
132. Id at 564, 423 A2d at 631.
133. Id at 566-67, 423 A2d at 632.
134. Id at 567, 423 A2d at 632.
135. Jurisdictional Statement of Princeton University at 6, Princeton University v Schmid, 455 US 100
(1982) (No 80-1576).
136. Id at 7-8.
137. Princeton University's Brief at 8-9, Princeton University v Schmid, 455 US 100 (1982) (No 80-
1576).
138. Id at 12.
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brief emphasized in attacking the rationale of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, did not give the government more power to review the
implementation of educational policies than if the university had decided to
inculcate an ideological orthodoxy.' 3 9
Though the brief did not focus on the academic freedom of faculty,
Princeton did mention in one sentence that the first amendment protects the
free speech of professors at public universities from state interference.
"Academic freedom," it added in a footnote, "is, of course, especially
important to those who teach as well as to the institutions at which they teach,
be they public or private." Princeton went on to make clear its own
commitment "to the freedom of its faculty and students to pursue knowledge
in their own way without interference by governmental or other authority." 40
Princeton's argument to the United States Supreme Court provoked
strong objections from many of its own faculty, particularly those with
professional interests in constitutional law.' 41 Faculty members urged the
administration not to prosecute Schmid' 42 and asserted that the decision to
prosecute, rather than involving purely a matter of administrative discretion,
posed a policy issue in which the entire university community should be
involved.' 4 3 When these views did not prevail, the faculty focused on its
substantive disagreements with the university's position.
Several professors worried that the broad immunity from judicial scrutiny
claimed by Princeton would allow any private university unreviewable
discretion to restrict the academic freedom of its faculty. Princeton's
"distorted" conception of academic freedom, one faculty member argued,
posed a far greater threat to intellectual life in universities than either
Schmid's activities or the holding of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Boards of trustees, following Princeton's theory, could simply assert that
faculty ideas are "incompatible" with the university's "educational
purposes."' 4 4 Private universities, other faculty members feared, could
invoke institutional academic freedom to preclude judicial review of
administrative decisions to fire a professor doing controversial research, to
determine the content of courses, to revise the grades assigned by faculty to
students, and to revoke tenure without cause.' 4 5 Professors criticized
Princeton for confusing its own institutional autonomy with the faculty's
139. Id at 18.
140. Id at 9, n12.
141. Andrew Barry, Professors Relieved Over Decision, Daily Princetonian 1 col 3 (January 15, 1982);
Letter from Thomas M. Scanlon to William G. Bowen (June 29, 1981); Memorandum from Walter F.
Murphy to William G. Bowen (July 8, 1981). Sanford Levinson, an assistant professor in the
Department of Politics at Princeton, represented Schmid from his initial arrest through the oral
argument in the United States Supreme Court.
142. Barry, Daily Princetonian at 2 col 5 (cited in note 141); Letter from Scanlon to Bowen (cited
in note 141).
143. Barry, Daily Princetonian at 2 col 5 (cited in note 141).
144. Letter from Scanlon to Bowen (cited in note 141). Professor Scanlon quoted from
Princeton's Jurisdictional Statement at 8 (cited in note 135).
145. Princeton Alumni Weekly 15 (December 1, 1981); Walter F. Murphy, Informal
Memorandum re Schmid Case (November 23, 1981) ("Murphy Informal Memorandum").
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academic freedom, and asserted that granting the immunity sought by the
university would violate the fundamental principle that no person or
institution is above the law. 146 One professor warned Princeton's president
that the best result Princeton could hope for in the Supreme Court would be a
decision holding it up as a "laughing stock... for attacking academic freedom
in particular and freedom of discussion in general in the name of private
property. Making fun of Princeton-with devastating logic-will become an
annual game in which students and faculty elsewhere will delight."' 47
The AAUP filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court that reiterated
and expanded in legal language many of these faculty views.' 48 It asserted
that Princeton's "novel and sweeping claims"' 49 combining institutional
autonomy and academic freedom, if accepted, would effectively insulate
private universities from any government scrutiny. The AAUP emphasized
that academic freedom and institutional autonomy are "related but essentially
different concepts."150 Academic freedom, the AAUP insisted, "is a scholar's
right to be free of institutional (or governmental) control in professional
utterance."' 5' Institutional autonomy can be derived from academic freedom
in the sense that university autonomy from external control may be necessary
to protect its educational functions, including the functions of professors
covered by academic freedom. But institutional autonomy also relates to the
general control of private property, traditionally protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, which is no different when the property
owner is a university, the corporate owner of a shopping center, or an
individual. According to the AAUP, Princeton made a fundamental mistake
by failing to distinguish between these two very different forms of institutional
autonomy. Only when a university's claims of institutional autonomy relate to
its educational functions, the AAUP maintained, is academic freedom at
stake. 152
The AAUP stressed that Princeton's invocation of institutional academic
freedom had no connection with its educational mission. Princeton was not
trying to protect against an external threat to internal decisions about
curriculum or faculty selection, or to the faculty's freedom to teach or do
research. Indeed, the Supreme Court of New Jersey indicated an
extraordinary willingness to deny state constitutional protection to expressive
activity inconsistent in any way with Princeton's professed educational
146. Barry, Daily Princetonian at 2 col 4-5 (cited in note 141); Murphy Informal Memorandum
(cited in note 145).
147. Memorandum from Murphy to Bowen (cited in note 141).
148. AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae, Princeton University v Schmid, 455 US 100 (1982) (No 80-
1576) ("AAUP Princeton Brief"). Indeed, Professor Thomas M. Scanlon, a professor of philosophy at
Princeton who had been involved in the internal university debate over the case (see notes 141-44
and accompanying text), signed the AAUP amicus brief as "of counsel." See also letter from Thomas
M. Scanlon to Matthew Finkin (July 22, 1981) (letter to main author of AAUP brief following up
telephone conversation and commenting on draft brief).
149. AAUP Princeton Brief at I (cited in note 148).
150. ld at 5.
151. Idat 2-3.
152. Id at 2, 3, 10, 18-19.
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goals.' 5 3 Princeton, moreover, never provided the slightest clue as to how the
material Schmid distributed and sold could interfere with these goals,
prompting the AAUP to wonder whether the state court decision "is actually
one regulating the university's 'academic functions' at all."' 154 Princeton
asserted only that any judicial review of the relationship between institutional
policies and educational objectives itself violates the institutional academic
freedom protected by the first amendment. The AAUP disagreed, observing
that the free exercise of religion, also protected by the first amendment, does
not prevent the courts from inquiring into the nature and authenticity of
religious belief. 155
Not surprisingly, the AAUP emphasized the dangers to faculty members it
perceived in Princeton's legal position. Princeton's broad claim of
institutional academic freedom, the AAUP warned, would effectively preclude
judicial review of institutional decisions "even in cases where the rights or
interests of the faculty might be adverse to the institution's administration."
Faculty complaints of employment discrimination or of university violations of
contractual commitments to academic freedom and tenure, the AAUP
observed, relate much more closely to institutional educational policies than
did Schmid's distribution and sale of political literature. The institutional
academic freedom Princeton invoked against Schmid would apply even more
strongly against these faculty complaints. A university could bar judicial
scrutiny of faculty contracts merely by claiming that it was following its own
educational policies. 156
In its reply brief, Princeton mostly reiterated its previous position;
however, it did respond briefly to some of these faculty concerns. Princeton
asserted that the academic freedom protected by the first amendment "is
freedom from governmental intrusion into the academic process." It
acknowledged that administrators in public universities could engage in
prohibited state action by interfering with the individual rights of professors
and students. Administrators in private universities, by contrast, are not
engaged in state action and thus cannot violate individual first amendment
rights even if they, like professors acting against each other, could infringe
academic freedom "in a non-constitutional sense." Yet private universities as
institutions, Princeton insisted, do have a first amendment right to determine
their educational policies free from government interference.' 5 7 The AAUP,
moreover, "grossly" misunderstood Princeton's legal argument against
Schmid by suggesting that it would enable the university to use the first
amendment as a defense to faculty assertions of contractual violations.
Princeton tersely commented that the state police power would permit the
153. Id at 15.
154. Id at 27 n8.
155. Idat21.
156. Id at 28. The letter from Scanlon to Bowen (cited in note 141) makes many of the points
discussed in the previous two paragraphs.
157. Princeton University's Reply Brief at 8 n8, Princeton University v Schmid, 455 US 100 (1982)
(No 80-1576).
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enforcement of faculty contracts,15 8 but never responded to the AAUP's
concern that asserted violations of contractual academic freedom and tenure
would implicate university educational policies, and thus under Princeton's
argument preclude judicial review, much more directly than the regulations
on outsider access applied against Schmid.
A letter from Princeton's university counsel to a faculty member who had
objected at length to the university's position in its jurisdictional statement
captures better than any legal papers the administration's reaction to faculty
concerns. The letter stressed that the legal arguments of the university in
Schmid "have nothing to do with the relative powers or rights within an
institution between the Trustees and individual faculty members or students,"
and promised in the university's next brief to avoid any possible implication
that Princeton wanted "to diminish the rights of individual faculty members
under the concept of academic freedom." Yet the letter also challenged the
view that the state is a better ally of faculty academic freedom than the
governing boards of private universities. During the McCarthy era, the
university counsel claimed, private institutions were substantially more
effective than their public counterparts in protecting scholars from state
intervention. He added that private boards of trustees, unlike the state, are
constrained by different constituencies within the university as well as by a
general ethos supporting academic freedom.
The university counsel assured that a Supreme Court victory for Princeton
in Schmid would not "directly affect to any degree whatsoever the relationships
between the trustees of a private institution and its faculty members." He did
concede, however, the possibility that "reasoning by analogy another court
down the road would apply rules enunciated in this case to the dissident
opinions of faculty and students." Yet a more realistic and directly relevant
fear, the counsel warned, was that a defeat for Princeton's position would
encourage additional state intervention in university educational decisions in
ways that might eventually constrain faculty academic freedom. He observed
the historical tendency of increased state power "to homogenization of
standards, to fear of the odd case, and to sensitivity to political fashions."
The counsel advised that professors, instead of relying on the state, including
its courts, to protect their academic freedom, should place their confidence in
the diversity of autonomous American universities. 159
B. University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
By holding that Princeton's new university regulations on access to the
campus by outsiders rendered the original dispute moot, the Supreme Court's
decision in Schmid 160 produced a severe anticlimax, but it did not end debate
on the scope of institutional academic freedom. In University of Pennsylvania v.
158. Id at 8 n9.
159. Letter from Thomas H. Wright to Thomas M. Scanlon (July 7, 1981).
160. 455 US 100.
[Vol. 53: No. 3
Page 227: Summer 1990] "INDIVIDUAL" & "INSTITUTIONAL" ACADEMIC FREEDOM 263
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 16 1 the University of Pennsylvania and
numerous amici relied on a first amendment claim of institutional academic
freedom in asking the Supreme Court to recognize a special privilege against
disclosure of confidential peer review materials to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in Title VII cases. The rationale for this
special privilege, while made in the context of a Title VII case alleging
discrimination based on gender and national origin, would apply as well to a
claim that a university impermissibly denied appointment or tenure in
violation of a faculty member's academic freedom.
Although various federal circuit courts had held in previous Title VII
litigation that constitutional academic freedom requires a qualified privilege
against disclosure 162 or a test balancing "academic freedom and educational
excellence on the one hand and individual rights to fair consideration on the
other,"' 63 the Third Circuit "expressly declined to limit the EEOC's
subpoena authority to accommodate an academic institution's constitutional
right to academic freedom."' 16 4 The court acknowledged that such disclosure
"would burden the tenure review process and would impact on academic
freedom,"' 6 5 but it rejected both a qualified privilege and a balancing test
because they would allow universities "to hide evidence of discrimination
behind a wall of secrecy."' 166
The University of Pennsylvania complained that the Third Circuit failed to
give any consideration to its first amendment interests in institutional
academic freedom. A confidential system of peer review, the university
insisted, is essential to determining "who may teach," one of the core
components of first amendment academic freedom identified by Frankfurter
in Sweezy. 16 7 The university readily conceded that the EEOC and individual
litigants may in certain circumstances have access to confidential peer review
documents in order to further the compelling state interest in eliminating
employment discrimination. It objected, however, to the Third Circuit's
"automatic disclosure" rule, which gave no weight whatsoever to university
interests in academic freedom 68 and required disclosure of confidential
material simply upon the filing of a complaint.16 9 According to the university,
the party seeking such material should have to demonstrate specific reasons
for disclosure that outweigh the first amendment interests in confidentiality
161. 110S Ct 577.
162. EEOC v University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F2d 331, 337 (7th Cir 1983).
163. Gray v Board of Higher Educ., City of iVew York, 692 F2d 901, 907 (2d Cir 1982).
164. EEOC v University of Pennsylvania, 850 F2d 969, 975 (3d Cir 1988), aff'd, 110 S Ct 577 (1990).
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit relied on its previous holding in EEOC v Franklin &
Marshall College, 775 F2d 110 (3d Cir 1985).
165. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F2d at 974.
166. Id at 975, quoting from Franklin & Marshall, 775 F2d at 115.
167. University of Pennsylvania Brief at 10-11, 17, 37, University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 110 S Ct
577 (1990) (No 88-493) ("University of Pennsylvania Brief").
168. Id at 12-14.
169. Id at 32, 34.
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shared by universities and the professors who participate in peer review.' 70
"Institutional academic freedom-the university's right to some degree of
autonomy-is a necessary corollary," the university maintained, "of the First
Amendment rights of the individual university professor." 171 As at Princeton,
a number of faculty members opposed the University's legal position. 72
The AAUP, while appearing as a nonaligned amicus and specifically
disclaiming any position on whether the university should be required to
disclose the confidential peer review materials at issue, challenged the Third
Circuit's legal standard as constitutionally inadequate.173 The AAUP had
anticipated this issue in Schmid, where it cited unrestrained discovery in Title
VII litigation as an example of government regulation that, unlike the holding
allowing Schmid access to Princeton's campus, could impinge upon a
university's academic freedom. 74 Presented with this precise issue in
University of Pennsylvania, the AAUP characterized the Third Circuit's holding
as containing the "startling proposition" that the first amendment protection
for academic freedom "in no way limits the subpoena authority of a
government agency."'75
The AAUP saw a precise analogy between EEOC investigations of tenure
files and the investigations into the contents of university lectures conducted
by legislative committees concerned about communist subversion during the
McCarthy era. "The single most consistent and most rigorous application of
this Court's academic freedom decisions," the AAUP stressed citing Sweezy,
"has related directly to investigative claims pressed by government itself."1 76
As in the earlier cases, the AAUP urged, the Court should not immunize
universities from government scrutiny, but should balance the competing
investigative and academic interests. The AAUP also took pains to note that
University of Pennsylvania did not pose any tension between the academic
170. Id at 45-46, 49. The University of Pennsylvania conceded that the university should provide
confidential letters on which the tenure decision is based to the EEOC and a statement of reasons for
the decision to the complainant or the EEOC. Substantial evidence of discrimination uncovered
from nonconfidential information, the university added, can justify access to otherwise confidential
peer review materials. Id at 46-47. This approach closely resembles the one advocated in AAUP, A
Preliminary Statement on Judicially Compelled Disclosure in the Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, 67
Academe 27 (February-March 1981) (attached as appendix A to AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae,
University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 110 S Ct 577 (1990) (No 88-493) ("AAUP University of Pennsylvania
Brief").
171. University of Pennsylvania Brief at 16 (cited in note 167).
172. The Association of Women Faculty and Administrators of the University of Pennsylvania
participated in a brief amici curiae in support of the EEOC. In its statement of interest, the
association maintained that its members "know from concrete experience-including the denial of
tenure to Professor Rosalie Tung, which gave rise to the present proceeding-that the task of
eradicating the effects of gender-based discrimination is far more difficult, and the need to retain
unimpaired the ability of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to carry out its mission far
more critical, than is suggested by petitioner [University of Pennsylvania] here." NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund and Rosalie Tung's Brief as Amici Curiae at 29, University of Pennsylvania
v EEOC, 110 S Ct 577 (1990) (No 88-493).
173. AAUP University of Pennsylvania Brief at 3 n6 (cited in note 170).
174. AAUP Princeton Brief at 25 (cited in note 148).
175. AAUP University of Pennsylvania Brief at 7 (cited in note 170).
176. Id at 5. See also id at 12.
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freedom of the university and the academic freedom of the faculty. Without
citing the 1915 Declaration, the AAUP stressed that by giving the faculty
primary responsibility for the tenure decision, the university was following a
traditional and well-justified academic policy that merited first amendment
protection. 77
The government's brief flatly denied that the Third Circuit's holding
interfered with academic freedom. While noting that prior Supreme Court
decisions had not clarified the definition of constitutional academic freedom,
the government assumed that it included the university's choice of professors.
Yet the government emphasized that Sweezy itself extended this freedom only
to decisions made "on academic grounds." University employment decisions
based on the kinds of invidious discrimination prohibited by Title VII, the
government suggested, are not made "on academic grounds" and thus are
not entitled to constitutional protection. Indeed, the government asserted
that individual faculty members have a countervailing academic freedom
interest in being evaluated on the basis of their professional performance.
EEOC investigations of peer review decisions determine only whether these
decisions are based on academic considerations or on discriminatory ones,
and thereby reinforce rather than undermine the appropriate tradition of
judicial deference to university decision-making. 78  The government
observed as well that when removing the exemption of universities from Title
VII in 1972, Congress rejected arguments that EEOC investigations would
violate academic freedom by intruding on the selection and promotion of
faculty. 179
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the University of Pennsylvania's
first amendment claim and essentially accepted the government's position.
Cases such as Sweezy and Keyishian, the Court observed, involved direct
governmental restrictions on the content of speech and on the right of the
university to determine who may teach. Unlike Keyishian, where the
government attempted to substitute its employment criteria for those of the
university, the EEOC left the University of Pennsylvania free to select and
apply its own standards as long as they did not violate the proscriptions
against employment discrimination in Title VII. The Court recognized that
the "precise contours"' 8 0 of its prior academic freedom decisions remained
undefined. Yet it considered itself fortunate in not having to provide
177. Id at 10 n9. See also Brief of Princeton University, Brown University, Harvard University,
and Yale University as Amici Curiae, University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 110 S Ct 577 (1990) (No 88-
493). Many within the AAUP opposed its policy of limiting disclosure of peer review materials and
objected to the official position in the AAUP brief. See Memorandum from Mary Gray, Chair of
Committee W of AAUP to Carol Stern, et al, Committee on Litigation (May 3, 1989) (conveying
unanimous recommendation of AAUP committee on the status of women that AAUP should not file
brief based on its existing Preliminary Statement). See also AAUP, University of Pennsylvania v EEOC
and the Status of Peer Review: A Symposium, 76 Academe 31 (May-June 1990) (various reactions of
professors and a college president to Supreme Court decision).
178. Respondent's Brief at 26-29, 26-27 n19, University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 110 S Ct 577
(1990) (No 88-493).
179. Id at 12-13.
180. 110SCtat 586.
